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PLAIN MEANING, EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE, AND
AMBIGUITY: MYTH AND REALITY IN
INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM
Insurance coverage disputes are mostly about the correct
interpretation of an insurance policy provision. But three myths confuse and
confound thinking about the interpretation of insurance policies. The first
myth is that an unambiguous insurance policy provision – a provision with
a “plain” meaning – carries that meaning on its face. The second myth is
that, if a policy provision has a plain meaning, then under the plain-meaning
“rule,” sources of meaning outside the four corners of the insurance policy
– sources “extrinsic” to the policy -- are not admissible to aid in interpreting
the provision. The third myth is that ambiguous policy provisions are
necessarily construed against the drafter, which in insurance is almost
always the insurer. In reality, all three myths seriously oversimplify how
interpretation takes place. The problem, however, is not that, in acting in
ways that are inconsistent with the simplifying myths, the courts are
undermining desirable rules by quietly following other, undesirable rules.
On the contrary, we do not need to change the rules or practices that govern
insurance policy interpretation; Rather, we need more clarity and a deeper
understanding of the sophisticated, complex rules and practices that are
actually in force and are actually applied in practice. This Article aims to
provide both.

David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor, University of
Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Tom Baker, Kyle Logue, and Daniel
Schwarcz for helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Insurance coverage disputes are mostly about the correct
interpretation of an insurance policy provision.1 The heated controversy that
took place over a period of years at the American Law Institute (“ALI”)
regarding the interpretation provisions of the Restatement of the Law of
Liability Insurance (“RLLI”)2 reflects the crucial role that the rules
governing interpretation play in coverage disputes. In 2017, the ALI
membership approved a rule that for several years had been included in drafts
of the RLLI, permitting the introduction of extrinsic evidence, without limit,
in order to determine whether a policy provision is ambiguous.3 But the
following year there was an about face. The Reporters recommended and the
ALI adopted an amendment embodying the plain-meaning rule, which
precludes the introduction of extrinsic evidence if the meaning of a policy
provision is plain on its face.4 This rule, and the entire RLLI, are now final.5

1

A quick glance at any of the principal insurance law casebooks confirms
that this is the case. See generally, KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL
SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION (6th ed. 2015); TOM BAKER
& KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2013); LEO P. MARTINEZ & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW (8th ed. 2018); JEFFREY W.
STEMPEL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW (4th ed. 2011).
2
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE (AM. L. INST.,
Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 2018) [hereinafter RLLI].
3
Id. at § 3(2). This Section also provided for a presumption in favor of
the plain meaning (if any) of the provision. This presumption had no explicit
support in the case law. Rather, the minority, contextual rule, is that extrinsic
evidence is admissible, but with no presumption in favor of plain meaning,
to demonstrate that a provision that is unambiguous on its face contains a
“latent” ambiguity. Id. at § 3 cmt. a; see also City of Gross Pointe Park v.
Michigan Mun. Liab. Pool, 702 N.W. 2d 106, 113 (Mich. 2005); Brown
Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 932, 942 (Ala.
1983).
4
RLLI § 3.
5
See, e.g., Eyeblaster, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 613 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir.
2010) (stating that “[t]he plain meaning of tangible property includes
computers....”).
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This extended controversy, and the limitations of the restatement
form, however, obscured and oversimplified both the rules governing
interpretation and the process of interpretation that the rules govern. 6 In fact,
the whole controversy was emblematic of three simplifying myths that
confuse and confound thinking about the interpretation of insurance policies.
The first myth is that an unambiguous insurance policy provision – a
provision with a “plain meaning” – carries that meaning on its face. In reality,
many policy provisions are accorded a plain meaning through an active
process of interpretation. Courts often do not simply receive a plain meaning
by reading an insurance policy. Rather, they actively construct that single,
“plain” meaning.
The second myth is that, if a policy provision has a plain meaning,
then under the plain-meaning rule, sources of meaning outside the four
corners of the insurance policy – sources “extrinsic” to the policy -- are not
admissible to aid in interpreting the provision.7 In reality, important sources
of meaning outside of an insurance policy may be considered, and often are
considered, in interpreting policy provisions that courts then hold have an
unambiguous, plain meaning.8
The third myth concerns ambiguous policy provisions – those that
are reasonably susceptible to two different interpretations. Under the
doctrine contra proferentem (“against the offeror” or drafter),9 ambiguous
policy provisions are supposedly construed against the drafter, which in
insurance is almost always the insurer.10 In reality, a finding of ambiguity
merely authorizes the introduction of otherwise-inadmissible extrinsic
evidence to aid in interpreting the ambiguous provision.11 In addition, in
6

The RLLI did not fall prey to these myths, but the necessary
requirements of both brevity and format (black-letter rules followed by
concise “comments”) limited its capacity to dispel them, and foreclosed the
kind of extended analysis undertaken here.
7
See ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 121 (6th ed. 2018) (describing this view without endorsing
it).
8
RLLI § 3 cmt. b.
9
See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 41; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §206 (1981) (providing for interpretation “against
the Draftsman”).
10
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7 at 127, and at n.305 (identifying this
view and citing courts adopting it).
11
See RLLI § 4 cmt. b.
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reality, even when the provision remains ambiguous after such extrinsic
evidence is considered, the courts do not necessarily construe the provision
in favor of coverage.12
In my view, what occurs in reality in all three respects is perfectly
acceptable. The problem is not that, in acting in ways that are inconsistent
with the simplifying myths, the courts are undermining desirable rules by
quietly following other, undesirable rules. On the contrary, the problem is
that statements the courts and commentators make often oversimplify the
rules that are actually being applied, and thereby perpetuate misconceptions
about the realities of insurance policy interpretation. We do not need to
change the rules or practices that govern insurance policy interpretation; we
need more clarity and a deeper understanding of the sophisticated, complex
rules and practices that are actually in force and are actually applied in
practice.13
This Article aims to provide both greater clarity and a deeper
understanding of these rules and practices. Part I sets the stage for the
analysis by distinguishing interpretation of insurance policies from both
application of the policy to a claim, and construction of the policy in order
to determine its legal effect. Because the plain-meaning rule applies only to
interpretation, these distinctions are crucial. Part II explores the nature of
insurance policy interpretation and the process of determining that policy
provisions have a plain meaning by consulting the “whole” policy. The
underlying insight that emerges is how active the process of arriving at a
“plain” meaning can be, even when nothing “extrinsic” to an insurance
policy is expressly taken into consideration.
Part III then considers the seemingly contradictory practice of
expressly and openly considering certain matters that are extrinsic to the
policy, even on the part of courts that follow a “strict” plain-meaning rule.
12

See discussion infra Section IV.B.
The insurance law with which this Article is concerned is, in effect,
insurance contract law. Many of the rules and concepts of insurance law are
drawn straightforwardly from the law of contract interpretation. Others,
however, are distinctive to insurance law, or find their most detailed
elaboration and application in insurance law. In most instances there is little
to be gained here from identifying in detail which rules replicate
conventional contract law and which rules are distinctive to insurance law,
although I will indicate important differences where appropriate, and will
cite general principles of contract law when they are applicable.
13
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Here I argue that this practice is not at all contradictory, because the matters
these courts routinely consider are extrinsic to the policy but are not
“evidence.” The plain-meaning rule, it turns out, is not really about plain
meaning, but about which sources may considered in determining whether a
policy provision has a single reasonable meaning.
Finally, Part IV examines interpretation and construction when a
policy provision is ambiguous. I show that the strong stare decisis effect
accorded to the interpretation and construction of ambiguous policy
provisions, as well as the notion that policy provisions that remain
ambiguous even in the face of extrinsic evidence are automatically construed
in favor of coverage, are both open to question. In short, this ambiguity about
ambiguity needs examination.14
I.

INTERPRETATION, APPLICATION, AND CONSTRUCTION

Courts performs three functions relating to the meaning of insurance
policies. Interpretation is the process of determining meaning.15 Application
is the process of determining whether, given the meaning of the relevant
policy provision or provisions, a claim for coverage involving particular
facts and circumstances is or is not covered. Construction is the process of
determining the legal effect of an insurance policy,16 which may or may not

14

Over twenty years ago, I developed a conceptual framework for
analyzing the factors that could influence courts’ determinations that policy
provisions are ambiguous, and of the consequences of these
determinations. See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy
Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531 (1996). In a sense, this Article is an
extension of that framework to the particular issue of the evidence that is
relevant to the plain-meaning/ambiguity issue, identifying factors bearing on
this issue at a level of detail that my general theory did not encompass. I note
at several points below where there is resonance with the earlier Article. In
addition, Part IV (C) adds a factor relevant to ambiguity (ambiguity as a
“trap”) that I had not recognized at that time.
15
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §200 (AM. L. INST. 1979);
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §7.08
(Zachary Wolfe ed., 4th ed. 2019).
16
Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of
Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 835 (1964).
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coincide with its meaning as determined by interpretation. The plainmeaning rule governs interpretation, not application or construction.
A.

INTERPRETATION

The plain-meaning rule prohibits considering extrinsic evidence of
a policy provision’s meaning when the policy provision has a plain meaning
on its face.17 By its terms, then, the rule only governs interpretation – the
determination of meaning. The dominance of the plain-meaning rule in
insurance contrasts starkly with general contract law, where the dominant
approach is to permit the introduction of extrinsic evidence to aid
interpretation.18 Interpretation is a matter for the court, unless it depends on
factually-disputed issues.19
It is sometimes said that a policy provision may be ambiguous in a
particular context but unambiguous in another context.20 The logical
implication of such statements is that the provision has a plain meaning in
one context but not a plain meaning in another context.21 For example, CGL
insurance policies typically contain a provision that excludes coverage of
liability for damage to property in the “care, custody or control” of the
insured.22 It may be indisputable that an insured holding an item of personal
17

See RLLI §3.
There is a plain-meaning rule in the general law of contracts, but many
jurisdictions have rejected it, even while adopting the plain-meaning rule for
insurance contracts. Id. at cmt a; JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §3.10 at
136 (7th ed. 2014). The “modern” view in general contract law expressly
permits the introduction of many forms of extrinsic evidence regardless of
ambiguity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §202 (AM. LAW INST.
1979) (providing that contracts are to be interpreted “in light of all the
circumstances”) and §202(4)-(5) (providing that interpretation is to take
place as consistent with relevant course of performance or dealing and usage
of trade). In addition, evidence of prior negotiations is admissible to establish
the meaning of the contract under many conditions. Id. at §214(c) It would
be only a slight exaggeration, therefore, to say that there is no plain-meaning
rule under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS.
19
See RLLI §2(2); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note
9, at §212(2).
20
See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 45.
21
See RLLI §3 cmt. f.
22
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 443.
18
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property in his arms has the property in his “care, custody or control.” The
provision therefore has a plain meaning in this context. On the other hand,
whether a parcel that has been delivered and left on the doorstep of the
insured is in the insured’s “care, custody or control” may be debatable. The
provision arguably does not have a plain meaning in this context.
A different way of making this point would be to say that the “care,
custody or control” exclusion has a plain meaning “as applied” to the claim
involving personal property held in the insured’s arms, but is ambiguous “as
applied” to the parcel left on the insured’s doorstep. There is nothing wrong
with this alternative formulation in itself, but it does risk confusing the
process of interpretation with the process of application. Under the plainmeaning rule, extrinsic evidence would not be admissible to interpret – to
determine the meaning of – the “care, custody or control” exclusion, whether
in the abstract or “as applied” to either of these claims for coverage.
However, as indicated next, extrinsic evidence about either claim would be
admissible to aid in the application of an interpretation made under the plainmeaning rule to a particular claim.
B.

APPLICATION

The plain-meaning rule does not preclude the introduction of all
extrinsic evidence. There is no prohibition on the admission of extrinsic
evidence in order to apply a policy provision to a claim for coverage. For
example, without evidence of the facts associated with a claim, the policy
could not be applied to a claim. In my earlier hypothetical, evidence of the
number of steps from the walkway up to the door of the insured’s home
would be admissible, because this evidence would not bear on the meaning
of the “care, custody or control” exclusion. Thus, extrinsic evidence is not
admissible regarding the major premise of the interpretive syllogism (i.e.,
“custody means…”), whereas extrinsic evidence regarding the minor
premise (“a parcel was left on the insured’s doorstep under the following
conditions…”) is admissible. And this kind of evidence – that the insured
suffered a loss, the conditions under which the loss occurred, the amount of
the loss, and so forth – is necessarily extrinsic to the policy.23
It is undoubtedly true that, in the course of applying a policy
provision to the facts of a claim, interpretation sometimes must occur. But
this is not inconsistent with the distinction between interpretation and
application. Interpretation does not have to be completed before application
begins, in order still to constitute interpretation. Policy provisions may seem
23

See RLLI § 2 cmt. f.
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to have a meaning in the abstract or in general that must be adjusted in the
course of application, or provisions may have a meaning that is too abstract
or too general to determine whether a claim is covered, until the particular
facts and details of a claim are known. The interpreting court can take these
claim-related facts into account in determining the meaning of the policy
provision to be applied to these facts, or in sharpening that meaning in light
of these particular facts. This does not violate the plain-meaning rule. What
matters is that the facts of the claim, and any other extrinsic evidence that is
admitted, be only a predicate to determining meaning, not a source of
meaning.
Thus, the process of applying the meaning of a policy provision to
the facts of a claim cannot always be altogether divorced from the act of
interpretation, but it can be divorced from the concept and function of
interpretation. An interpretation, standing alone, is like a rule – its meaning
has a level of generality that is not necessarily self-applying, any more than
legal rules are always self-applying. And just as applying a legal rule to a set
of facts sheds light on the meaning of the rule, so the effort to apply the
interpretation of a policy provision to a claim may sometimes shed additional
light on the meaning of the provision.
Applying an interpretation to a claim may involve an implicit act of
mini-, or concrete, interpretation. For example, if an auto liability
insurance policy covers liability for injury “arising out of the use” of an auto,
determination that “use” means to drive or otherwise employ would not
automatically resolve the questions whether “use” includes throwing a
firecracker out the window of a parked car.24 Application of the term “use”
to this set of facts requires what amounts to further interpretation in this
concrete circumstance. The interpretation may be only implicit in the result,
or the court may explain why these facts do or do not constitute a “use,” thus
expressly interpreting that term in this particular context. The combination
of a series of applications to similar claims involving slightly different facts
may produce what amounts to a more detailed interpretation of the term
“use.” But the facts of the claim in these situations serve only as a predicate
to, not a source of, the interpretation.
Similarly, in Stone Container Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler
Inspection and Ins. Co.,25 a boiler and machinery insurance policy excluded
coverage of losses caused by explosion, with an exception for losses caused
See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 637 P.2d 491, 494 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1981).
25
165 F.3d 1157 (7th Cir. 1999).
24
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by explosion of an “object of a kind described below.” Included in the list
objects described below were “(1) Steam boiler” and “(2) Electric steam
generator.” The policyholder made a claim for coverage of a loss resulting
from the explosion of a pulp digester. The court held that these policy
provisions were unambiguous, and that a pulp digester did not satisfy the
requirement that it be “of a kind” with the listed objects, because (although
a pulp digestor was “closest to a steam boiler”), a steam boiler creates steam
by boiling water, whereas the steam in a pulp digester is generated outside
and then fed into the digestor.26
Although the court’s opinion (by Posner, J.) did not recount the
court’s thought process, it seems highly likely that the court did not first
determine in the abstract what kinds of objects were “of a kind” with those
listed, and only after determining what characteristics these objects had in
common, then turn to the facts of the claim to identify the characteristics of
pulp digesters. Rather, in all probability the court attributed a provisional
meaning to the policy provision, looked at the record evidence and thought
about the characteristics of pulp digesters, reflected again about the meaning
of the policy provision, and through this process of provisional interpretation
and provisional application, arrived at a conclusion that applied the now
better-understood meaning of the provision to the claim for coverage of
losses caused by the pulp digestor’s explosion. Interpretation of the provision
and application of the meaning arrived at through interpretation to the pulp
digestor involved an iterative, or reflexive, process.
When both interpretation and application are matters for the court,
then all this is mainly a matter of nomenclature, for both are then subject to
appellate review. In contrast, when interpretation is for the court but
application, even in the absence of a dispute about the empirical facts, is a
question of fact (as it is in a minority of jurisdictions27), then applications,
including the concrete interpretations that follow from application, may vary
from case to case, even when the relevant facts are identical. If application
is a question of fact, then some explosions of pulp digestors will be covered,
and some will not be covered, by the same insurance policy that was at issue
in Stone Container, depending on the application of the policy language by
the trier of fact in each individual case.
This seems undesirable, in light of the fact that standard-form
insurance policies should provide the same coverage to identically-situated
insureds. The dominant, and I think preferable, approach, is therefore for
26
27

Id. at 1160.
See RLLI § 2 cmt. f.
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both interpretation and application to be matters for the court. When
application depends on the resolution of a purely empirical dispute (e.g.,
whether this pulp digestor generated its own steam), the need for a finding
of fact can be satisfied by asking the jury to bring in a special verdict, to be
followed by the court’s applying its interpretation to the factual findings
contained in the that verdict.
The central point, however, is that the facts of a claim are not, and
may not be permitted to be, a source of meaning. Rather, these facts may
stimulate and focus the court’s thinking about the meaning of the relevant
policy provision on its face, and about the proper application of this meaning
to the claim. The two functions, interpretation and application, are logically
and conceptually distinct, even when they occur in an iterative sequence and
the facts of the claim help to inform the court’s thinking. Interpretation is
logically prior to application, even when the two are temporally mixed.
C.

CONSTRUCTION

Interpretation must also be distinguished from construction, which
is the process of determining the legal effect of a policy provision, or any
other contract.28 A policy provision can have one meaning (or more than one)
but a different legal effect. Contra proferentem is a rule of construction,
addressing the legal effect of ambiguous policy language. Similarly, the rule
that policy language that affirmatively provides coverage should be
construed broadly, and language (such as an exclusion) restricting coverage
should be construed narrowly is, as it states, a rule of construction.29 Whether
this rule is anything other than an application of contra proferentem is not
entirely clear, since some courts appear not to treat it this way, but that
question is not pertinent here. And the invalidation of a policy provision on
the ground that it violates public policy–for example, by covering liability
for punitive damages30–is likewise an act of construction rather than
interpretation.
Construction is sometimes camouflaged as interpretation, either
unintentionally or deliberately, in order to obscure the extent of a court’s

28

Id. §2 cmt. (g); FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, § 7.08.
See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 127.
30
See generally Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 678
(N.D. Tex. 1998).
29
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lawmaking.31 This kind of conflation of the two functions can lead to
uncertainty about what rules govern interpretation. A prominent example
involves the letter sent to insurance commissioners in the early 1970s by
insurance industry rating bureaus seeking state regulatory approval of the
incorporation of a qualified “pollution exclusion” into the standard-form
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) insurance policy of the period. The
proposed provision excluded coverage of liability for bodily injury or
property damage caused by the discharge of pollutants, but contained an
exception for discharges that were “sudden and accidental.” Some years after
the exclusion was approved, policyholders contended in coverage disputes
that, among other things, this letter’s assertions about the meaning and effect
of the exception to the exclusion were misleading, and that insurers should
therefore be estopped to assert that the term “sudden” had a temporal
component.32
This is best understood as an argument about the proper construction
of the term “sudden,” not about the interpretation of that term. The argument
was, in effect, that even if the plain meaning of “sudden” within the four
corners of the policy included a temporal component, the policy should not
be enforced to give the provision its plain, temporal meaning. Because
construction in such instances is a judicial intervention upsetting the meaning
of a policy provision, courts may sometimes understandably be reluctant to
acknowledge that they are engaged in construction rather than interpretation.
Extrinsic evidence, such as the letter to insurance commissioners, should be
admissible as relevant to construction, even when it is not admissible for
purposes of interpretation. Confusing or conflating the two processes risks
obfuscating the rule regarding the evidence that may considered when
interpretation, and not construction, occurs.
II.

PLAIN MEANING AND THE “WHOLE” POLICY

Courts following the plain-meaning rule do not merely stare at the
words of a policy provision in order to determine whether the provision is
ambiguous, or to determine what the provision means once they conclude
that it is not ambiguous. Thus, plain meaning is not a self-evident fact. The
31

See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, §7.08, at 7-75 (stating that
courts "have more often ignored [this distinction] by characterizing the
process of 'construction' as that of 'interpretation' in order to obscure the
extent of their control over private agreement").
32
For discussion of this multi-year episode, see American States Ins.
v. Koloms, 687 N.E. 2d 72, 79-82 (Ill. 1997).
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conclusion that a policy provision has a plain meaning is itself the result of
an interpretive process that is not always simple or one-dimensional.
Typically, a plain meaning does not find the court. Rather, the court finds a
plain meaning. It turns out that there is a lot more to plain meaning, and to
the plain-meaning rule, than meets the eye.
A frequent formulation of the prohibition on the admission of
extrinsic evidence is that the court must stay within the “four corners” of the
policy in determining the meaning of the disputed provision.33 Of course, if
in doing so the court determines that the provision is not ambiguous, it has
simultaneously determined the plain meaning of the provision, because an
unambiguous policy provision is one that has only a single reasonable
meaning.
The four-corners limitation reveals little, however, about how active
the process of interpretation that is confined in this way actually is permitted
to be, and often is. The material within the four corners of the policy is,
obviously, the whole policy. The plain-meaning rule therefore not only
permits consulting the whole policy to determine the meaning of a particular
provision; it would be imprudent not to consult the whole policy in doing so.
Just as courts do not stare at a policy provision in order to determine
if it has a plain meaning, they do not merely read the whole policy to help
determine the meaning of a particular provision. First, a set of normative
presumptions about how the “whole” insurance policy has been constructed
and functions serve to guide interpretation of policy provisions whose
meaning might otherwise be in doubt. Second, the canons of interpretation –
which surprisingly have not been recognized to be directly about the
relevance of the “whole” policy or contract – often provide strong direction
about the significance of other provisions or terms in the policy for a disputed
provision’s meaning.
A.

THREE NORMATIVE PRESUMPTIONS ABOUT THE “WHOLE”
POLICY

Both the general injunction to read the policy as a whole34 and the
canons of interpretation do more than confirm that the meaning of one policy
33

See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 121.
The notion that the whole contract is to be considered is a principle of
both general contract law and insurance law. See RLLI § 3 cmt. g;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §202(2); National Union Fire Ins.
34
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provision can shed light on the meaning of another provision. These
principles of interpretation also reflect the notion that an insurance policy is
a functioning mechanism, containing different parts that work together.
Recognizing the functional quality of insurance policies reveals three
features of the “whole” policy that are reflected in the courts’ approach to
the interpretation of insurance policies.
These are the soft presumptions of consistency, coherence, and nonredundancy. The courts often do not state that they are following or invoking
these presumptions, in part because the presumptions are so fundamental as
to be almost transparent. But the courts follow them, nonetheless. This is
because an insurance policy is not only a contract, but a communication of
the terms of the contract to the parties and to the courts. The courts assume
that, other things being equal, the parties have attempted not to contradict or
unnecessarily repeat themselves, because these are features of effective and
rational communication.
Nonetheless, because language is an imperfect instrument of
communication, and the drafters of insurance policies sometimes imperfectly
employ this imperfect instrument, the provisions contained in insurance
policies are not always consistent, coherent, and non-redundant. For this
reason, in practice the presumption that insurance policies have these
characteristics are soft presumptions only, working propositions with an
“other things being equal” quality to them.
1. Consistency
The strongest presumption is that policy provisions do not contradict
each other. There is obviously something of a continuum running from
complete consistency among policy provisions, to mere coherence, to lack
of coherence, and finally to outright contradiction. There is at least a
qualitative difference between an interpretation that avoids outright
contradiction and one that goes further, by ensuring coherence among policy
provisions. A policy provision may be out of keeping with the remainder of
an insurance policy without directly contradicting another provision. In this
situation a provision that does not cohere with the remainder of the policy
could nonetheless be interpreted without the other provisions failing to
function. But outright contradiction would render at least one of two
inconsistent provisions inoperative. Insurers that draft standard-form
Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 213 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1340 (D. Colo. 2016); Progressive
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 80 F. Supp. 3d 923, 946 (N.D. Iowa
2015).
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policies do not intend to include contradictory provisions in their policies,
nor would policyholders intend to purchase a policy containing contradictory
provisions.
It is for this reason, I think, that cases involving outright
contradiction are rare.35 When there is a real contradiction, the courts tend to
hold that the conflict between two unambiguous, contradictory provisions
creates an ambiguity. For example, in Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard
Ins. Co.,36 a policy contained two contradictory Endorsements. The court
held that the contradiction created ambiguity, and interpreted the policy
against its drafter, the insurer.37 I have not found any case in which a party
argued in favor of an interpretation that would blatantly contradict the plain
meaning of another provision without asserting that the result was
ambiguous policy language. Rather, the argument made in such situations is
that the policy is ambiguous.
The virtually complete absence of cases in which the plain meaning
of one policy provision is given precedence over the plain meaning of
another provision that contradicts it, without a holding of ambiguity, is
evidence of how powerful the presumption of consistency is. No one argues
for an interpretation that would contradict the plain meaning of another
policy provision, both because insurers try mightily not to draft contradictory
language, and because the presumption of consistency is so strong.
Reconciling apparent inconsistency is the name of the game.
2. Coherence
A second principle that follows from the notion that an insurance
policy is a functional vehicle of communication that should be read as a
whole is that a policy is likely to be coherent.38 This means that, when a
provision can be read to cohere with the other provisions in the policy, it

35

See, e.g., PBM Nutritionals, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 724 S.E.2d
707, 712-13 (Va. 2012) (rejecting contention that two policy provisions were
in conflict).
36
387 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1986).
37
Id. at 644-45.
38
But see In re SRC Holding Corp., 545 F.3d 661, 668 (8th Cir. 2008)
(stating that “whether policy coverage ‘makes sense’ as a business matter is
largely irrelevant....”).
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should be read to cohere.39 Presuming coherence is not the same as
interpreting to avoid direct contradiction. There may be no literal or actual
contradiction or inconsistency between one provision and the entire
remainder of the policy, but one interpretation of a provision might
nonetheless be out of keeping with the remainder.40
For example, in Liristis v. American Family Ins. Co.,41 the insureds’
home was contaminated by mold, apparently as a result of water used to
extinguish a fire at the property. Their homeowners insurer denied coverage,
relying on an exclusion providing that the policy did not cover “loss to the
property...resulting directly or indirectly or caused by any one or more of the
following...c. smog, rust, corrosion, frost condensation, mold wet or dry
rot...”42 The court held that the loss was not excluded, because the mold
contamination was not a cause of loss, but the loss itself. It would not have
contradicted this language to hold that the mold contamination was excluded.
It would have been plausible to hold that mold contamination resulted from
mold. But the policy language did distinguish between the cause of a loss
and the loss itself. The court’s holding in effect took the position that the
exclusion in question should be interpreted so as to be coherent with the
policy’s distinction between causes of loss, on the one hand, and loss itself,
on the other hand.
3. Non-redundancy
The softest presumption arising out the injunction that an insurance
policy should be read as a whole is that policy language is not redundant –
that every provision in a policy has an independent meaning.43 Every
39

The principle that every provision should be accorded some meaning
is an aspect of this notion. See, e.g., Bedford Internet Office Space, LLC v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 41 F. Supp. 3d 535, 547 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (interpreting a
policy so as to avoid rendering a policy provision of no effect).
40
See, e.g., S. Tr. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 474 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2015) (holding that policy’s consistently drawing a distinction between
fire, on the one hand, and vandalism and malicious mischief, on the other
hand, was significant).
41
61 P.3d 22 (Ariz. 2002).
42
Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
43
This is a general principle of contract law interpretation.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981); FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, §7.13.
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provision, that is, is presumed to do work and to be a necessary part of the
policy.44
The reason this presumption is so soft is that it is in tension with a
counter-tendency that also is sometimes exhibited by the drafters of
insurance policies. This is the practice of sometimes including duplicative
provisions in order to ensure or emphasize the importance of a limitation on
coverage. This is the familiar “belt and suspenders” approach that is
employed in the drafting of many legal documents.45 Because the drafters
want to avoid uncertainty, as well as the disputes and litigation that
uncertainty may yield, they sometimes include duplicative provisions out of
an excess of caution.
For example, in TMW Enterprises v. Federal Ins. Co., the
policyholder argued that the insurer’s interpretation of an all-risk property
insurance policy rendered the “ensuing loss” in the policy “superfluous,
empty words with no independent function.”46 The court responded with an
interpretation that gave the clause an independent meaning, but then
continued: “But even if we choose to label this type of drafting a form of
redundancy, which we do not think it is, that label surely is not a fatal one
when it comes to insurance contracts, where redundancies abound.”47 That
phrase seems to have resonated with subsequent courts. It has since been
cited in a number of opinions addressing putative redundancies in insurance
policies.48
44

See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Infogroup, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 815, 822
(S.D. Iowa 2015) (stating that “The Court interprets undefined words in the
context of the policy as a whole, and avoids interpreting the policy in such a
way as to render parts of a contract ‘surplusage’”); Northrup Grumman Corp.
v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 2d 945, 951 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(applying the principle of non-redundancy).
45
See, e.g., Cactus Ave., LLC v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., No.
E051787, 2012 WL 649966, at * 4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2012) (indicating
that “Here, similarly, an insurer could understandably want to take a ‘beltand-suspenders’ approach and thus exclude losses under the seepage
exclusion, the water exclusion, or both”); In re SRC Holding Corp., 545 F.3d
661, 670 (8th Cir. 2008) (“nothing prevents the parties from using a belt and
suspenders approach in drafting the exclusions, in order to be doubly sure”).
46
TMW Enters. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 619 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2010).
47
Id. (emphasis added).
48
See, e.g., Ardente v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 744 F.3d 815, 819 (1st Cir.
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B. The Canons of Interpretation
The function of a series of “canons” of interpretation, well known in
contract law generally, is to identify a number of commonly-occurring
relationships between or among provisions, and to specify the significance
of these relationships. A number of the canons of interpretation are in fact
directed primarily at the implications of the provisions in the remainder of
the policy for the meaning of a disputed provision.49
For example, expressio unius est exclusio alterius directs that the
expression of one thing should be considered the exclusion of another thing
that is not expressed.50 If a liability insurance policy provides that it covers
liability for “damages,” it is a fair inference that the absence of any mention
of liability for “restitution” implies that the latter is not covered.51
Similarly, the canon ejusdem generis indicates that where general
language is accompanied by a list of examples, the general language is to be
interpreted as referring to things of the same kind as are listed.52 Thus, an
exclusion of coverage of liability for injury or damage caused by “war,”
including “undeclared or civil war,” as well as “warlike action by a military
force,” and “insurrection, rebellion, [and] revolution” implies that the term
“war” does not included terrorism.53
Finally, under the canon noscitur a sociis, the meaning of a word is
to be understood by reference to the meaning of the words around it.54
According to this canon, an exclusion referring to the “release” of pollutants,
as part of a list referring to the “discharge, dispersal, release or escape” of
2014); U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Benchmark Constitution Servs., 797 F.3d 116,
123 (1st Cir. 2015).
49
For discussion of the canons, see JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR.,
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 470-71 (5th ed. 2011); 2 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 293-95 (3d ed. 2004).
50
See MURRAY, supra note 49, at 471; Farnsworth, supra note
49, §7.13.
51
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 466. See also Old Republic
Ins. Co. v. Stratford Ins. Co., 777 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying, in
effect, expressio unius, by noting that the policy made reference to one
feature of the insured’s business and notably did not refer to another feature).
52
See MURRAY, supra note 49, at 471; FARNSWORTH, supra note 49,
§7.13.
53
See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 469.
54
See MURRAY, supra note 49, at 470.
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pollutants, for example, would be interpreted to be listing means by which
pollutants may be freed from confinement, and not to the deposit of
pollutants into a place of confinement.55
In each of these situations, the application of a canon about the
significance of other policy language helped to render unambiguous a policy
provision that might otherwise be regarded as reasonably susceptible to two
different interpretations. The meaning of “damages” was clarified by virtue
of the absence of any reference to “restitution” in liability insurance policy;
the term “war” was interpreted not to include “terrorism” because of the
examples of “war” included in the policy; and the meaning of “release” was
interpreted by reference to the list of similar terms surrounding it. In all three
situations the canons were, in effect, applications of the more general
injunction that the interpretation of a disputed policy provision should not
occur in isolation from the rest of the policy. Rather, the policy is to be read
as a whole.56
The lesson of my examination of the injunction to read the policy as
a whole is that identification of a policy provision’s plain meaning is often
an active process. The conclusion that a policy provision has a plain meaning
means only that, based on the sources of meaning that may be consulted, the
provision has a single reasonable meaning that must be deemed “plain” by
virtue of the process of interpreting it. The plain-meaning rule is not about
“plain” meaning, but about the sources that may be consulted to determine
whether a policy provision has only one reasonable meaning. These
observations about the complexity of the process of determining plain
meaning are rendered all the more forceful once the matter that lies outside
the four corners of the policy, but still may be considered under the plainrule, are brought into view.
III.

EXTRINSIC SOURCES OF MEANING UNDER THE PLAINMEANING RULE

Even under the plain-meaning rule, courts routinely and expressly
consult certain sources of meaning that are outside the four corners of the
insurance policy. These include facts that are so fundamental that they do not
55

See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Amer., 517 N.W. 2d 888,
891 (Minn. 1994).
56
See MURRAY, supra note 49, at 470; FARNSWORTH, supra note
49, §7.13.
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even need to be articulated as sources of meaning; the “purpose” of a form
of insurance coverage or a particular policy provision; dictionary definitions;
other judicial decisions, statutes and regulations; and secondary legal
sources.57
The RLLI notes in a comment that, although the majority of courts
follow the plain-meaning rule, these courts sometimes differ about which
sources outside an insurance policy may be considered in interpreting an
unambiguous policy provision. In this sense, the RLLI suggests, it might be
said that there is not a “single” plain-meaning rule. The differences, however,
are minimal. A few plain-meaning courts have taken the position that
evidence of custom, practice, and usage may be considered even in
interpreting an unambiguous policy provision.58 These courts seem to treat
such matters as “legislative facts” of the sort I discuss below in Section C.
But for the most part, courts that subscribe to the plain-meaning rule do not
consider custom, practice, and usage when interpreting unambiguous policy
provisions.
How is it that certain sources of meaning outside of the policy can
be considered, notwithstanding the prohibition against considering extrinsic
evidence? The answer is that each of the above sources of meaning may be
considered, despite the fact that they lie outside the four corners of the policy,
because they are form of “implicit” knowledge without which judicial
reasoning could not take place; because they are facts subject to judicial
notice; or because they are “legislative” facts that are not subject to the rules
of evidence.
A.

IMPLICIT KNOWLEDGE

Insurance policy provisions are not self-defining. Modern contract
theory has long recognized that a particular interpretation may be simple,
straightforward, and incontestable, but that it is an interpretation
nevertheless, even when it is the only reasonable interpretation.59 This is
because the reader of a contract, such as an insurance policy, including the
57

See RLLI § 3 cmt. b.
See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189, 1193
(Pa. 2001); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 36 (Fl. 2000);
Beazley Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ace American Ins. Co., 880 F. 3d 64, 69 (2d Cir.
2018); RLLI § 3 cmt. c.
59
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, at §7.11 (arguing that it is
questionable whether a word has a meaning at all when divorced from the
circumstances).
58
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judicial reader, always encounters contract language in a context, and always
brings to bear what he or she already knows or supposes to be the relevant
context when understanding – and therefore when interpreting – the meaning
of that language. For the legal reader, this includes background
understandings of the legal and insurance market contexts in which an
insurance policy operates.
Sometimes courts expressly articulate the context in which the
interpretive task is situated. But often that context is so transparent to courts,
and courts expect that context to be so transparent to the legal readers to
whom the court’s opinion is mainly addressed, that it does not occur to the
court that making explicit what is implicit in the court’s reasoning is
necessary. But logically, this context – which lies outside the four corners of
the insurance policy -- is a source that contributes to the meaning of the
policy provision being interpreted. As James Bradley Thayer noted in the
first modern treatise on evidence over a century ago, “In conducting a
process of judicial reasoning, as of other reasoning, not a step can be taken
without assuming something which has not been proved; and the capacity to
do this with competent judgement and efficiency, is imputed to judges and
juries as part of their necessary mental outfit.”60
I call these assumptions and sources of meaning “implicit
knowledge.” For example, many liability insurance policies cover liability
incurred “because of” bodily injury or property damage.61 To the best of my
knowledge, no court has ever held this phrase to be ambiguous. Nonetheless,
to understand what the words mean, it is necessary to know that damages
awarded in tort cases alleging bodily injury or property damage may include
losses that are the consequence of the injury damage in question, such as
medical expenses for treating bodily injury, or profits lost because of damage
to property. Liability for these kinds of consequential losses is imposed
“because of” bodily injury or property damage, even if it is not “for” such
injury or damage.
Because all courts know this, the words “because of” in liability
insurance policies seem in most cases to carry their meaning “on their face,”
without needing any interpretation. But that only appears to be the case. It is
the legal and insurance context in which the words “because of” are used in
60

JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
279-80 (1898).
61
See, e.g., ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 439 (CGL
insurance policy).
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liability insurance policies that renders them subject to only one reasonable
interpretation. However, when a claim for coverage of an unconventional
form of liability arises – for example, when the party seeking to recover
damages from the policyholder that are the consequence of bodily injury is
not the same party who suffered bodily injury – then the courts must become
more explicit what these words mean.62
Sometimes the legal and insurance context that informs the court’s
interpretation is more complex, but still “goes without saying.” For example,
in Federal Ins. Co. v. Raytheon Co., the policyholder claimed coverage under
its Directors & Officers (D&O) liability insurance policy for liability
incurred in an ERISA action; It had earlier been a defendant in a different
securities law suit. The D&O insurers contended that coverage of liability in
the second suit was excluded under a “pending and prior litigation” exclusion
in their policies. The exclusion applied to claims against the insured “based
upon, arising from, or in consequence of any demand, suit or other
proceeding” pending against the insured prior to a specified date. The court
held that the exclusion applied if the “allegations in the second complaint
find substantial support in the first complaint,” and concluded that they did.63
In order to arrive at this interpretation, however, the court had to
have an understanding the complexity of ERISA and securities law suits
generally, and the consequent detail that complaints typically contain,
including the standard allegations regarding jurisdiction, identity of the
parties, and remedies, that all such complaints make. These boilerplate
allegations would have no bearing on whether the complaints substantially
overlapped, since they are allegations that most complaints in complex civil
suits would contain. If these sorts of allegations had been relevant to the
application of the exclusion, however, then the overlap between the two
complaints would have appeared to be far more substantial than it actually
was – indeed, there probably would have been no issue even worth litigating.
The court did not articulate any of this background context, and it did not
need to do so. These facts about complex civil litigation were implicit
knowledge that were one of the sources of the meaning of the unambiguous
“prior and pending litigation” exclusion.
In short, it is inevitable and completely proper for courts to rely on
facts outside the four corners of an insurance policy that are necessary to an
62

See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. H.D. Smith, 829 F.3d 771, 774-45 (7th
Cir. 2017) (holding that state of West Virginia’s costs for addressing opiate
addition epidemic were incurred “because of” bodily injury, despite the fact
that West Virginia itself suffered no bodily injury).
63
See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Raytheon Co., 426 F.3d 491 (1st Cir. 2005).
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understanding of the meaning of policy provisions that the courts must
interpret. Ordinarily such facts would not be in dispute if they were made
explicit. But the meaning of the policy provision being interpreted might be
different if the facts were otherwise. The facts may “go without saying,” in
both senses of this phrase, but they are nonetheless sources of meaning
extrinsic to the language of the insurance policy itself that are routinely
sources relevant to the meaning of insurance policy provisions.
B.

ADJUDICATIVE FACTS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL NOTICE

More than fifty years ago, Kenneth Culp Davis distinguished
between “adjudicative” and “legislative” facts. The former are facts that
pertain specifically to the facts of a particular case, whereas the latter pertain
to legal reasoning or the formation of legal principles.64 Judicial notice is the
process by which a court recognizes as true an adjudicative fact so well
known and indisputable that it does not need to be formally introduced as
evidence.65
A court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts if the facts are
“generally known” or “can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”66 Certainly
dictionary definitions of terms used in an insurance policy fall into this
category. The same is true of such matters as the fact that the most direct
route of flight between New York and Miami is partly over water more than
three miles outside the territorial limits of the United States, a fact that
figured in a well-known case involving the interpretation of policy language
requiring that crashes occur “within” the United States.67 Adjudicative facts
of this sort lie outside the four corners of an insurance policy. But courts may

64

Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404-07 (1942).
65
Judge Posner also has observed that some “information tends to fall
somewhere between facts that require adversary procedure to determine and
facts of which a court can take judicial notice,” candidly acknowledging that
“judges and their law clerks often conduct research on cases, and it is not
always research confined to pure issues of law, without disclosure to the
parties.” Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2015).
66
FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
67
See Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838 (1981).
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take judicial notice of such facts and rely on them as sources of the meaning
of policy provisions.
C.

LEGISLATIVE FACTS

In addition, the rules of evidence do not preclude courts from
considering what have been called “legislative facts,” to distinguish them
from adjudicative facts that pertain to the particular dispute.68 A classic
example of a legislative fact is the proposition that testimony by one spouse
against another in a criminal proceeding would undermine most any
marriage.69 The purpose of a particular form of insurance, or of a particular
standard-form policy provision, would generally fall into this category as
well.
In contrast to adjudicative facts that are subject to judicial notice,
which must effectively be indisputable, legislative facts need not satisfy this
test:
[J]udge-made law would stop growing if judges, in thinking about
law and policy, were forbidden to take into account facts they
believe, as distinguished from facts which are “clearly...within the
domain of the indisputable.” Facts most needed in thinking about
difficult problems of law and policy have a way of being outside the
domain of the clearly indisputable.70
Rather, a court’s authority to consider legislative facts “renders
inappropriate any limitation in the form of indisputability, any formal
requirements of notice other than those already inherent in affording
opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging briefs, and any requirement
of formal findings at any level.”71
There are numerous cases in which the courts consider legislative
facts outside the four corners of the insurance policy without ever holding
68

FED. R. EVID. 201 Advisory Committee’s note (a); Davis, supra note

64.
69

FED. R. EVID. 201 Advisory Committee’s note (a) (citing Hawkins v.
United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958)).
70
Id. (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on
Fairness and Convenience, in ROSCOE POUND ET AL., PERSPECTIVES OF
LAW 69, 82 (1964)).
71
Id.
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that a policy provision is ambiguous or admitting evidence regarding the
meaning of the provision. For example, in Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., the court held that the presence of
asbestos fibers in buildings operated by the policyholder did not constitute
“physical loss or damage” under its property insurance policies, because the
buildings were not uninhabitable or unusable. Interpreting the provision to
provide coverage, the court said, “would not comport with the intent of a
first-party ‘all-risks’ policy, but would transform it into a maintenance
contract.”72 There is nothing in the opinion indicating that evidence
regarding the “intent of a first-party all risks policy” had been introduced,
because there was no need for such evidence. That is a matter of legislative,
not adjudicative fact. The court’s own knowledge of the function of property
insurance, as distinguished from maintenance contracts, informed its
interpretation of the policy provision and led it to the plain meaning of the
policy.73
The court in City of Johnstown v Bankers Standard Ins. Co.74 relied
on the purpose of the insurance policy at issue in that case in a very similar
manner. The insured in that case claimed coverage of environmental cleanup
liability under its CGL insurance policies. Its insurers denied coverage on
the basis of a provision that excluded coverage of liability for property
damage that was “expected or intended” by the insured, arguing that the
provision precluded coverage of “risks” that the insured expected or
intended.75 The court rejected this argument, holding that “to exclude all
losses or damages which might in some way have been expected by the
insured could expand the field of exclusion until virtually no recovery could
be had on insurance. This is so since it is mishaps that are ‘expected’ – taken
in its broadest sense – that are insured against.”76 This conclusion was
obviously premised on the court’s understanding of the principal risks of
liability that CGL insurance policies are intended to cover. In effect the court
held that because CGL insurance policies are designed to cover liability for
72

311 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2002).
Id. There may of course be cases in which the purpose of a particular
policy provision is not a legislative fact, because the purpose arises out of a
feature of industry custom, or the needs of a particular policyholder. But the
general purpose of a particular form of insurance will almost always be a
legislative, not an adjudicative, fact.
74
877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989).
75
Id. at 1149.
76
Id. at 1150 (italics in original).
73
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negligence, the “expected or intended” provision could not properly be
interpreted to exclude coverage of liability for most negligence.
D.

TAKING STOCK

Courts subscribing to the plain-meaning rule routinely consider
certain matter outside the four corners of the insurance policy when
interpreting policy provisions: implicit knowledge, adjudicative facts subject
to judicial notice, and legislative facts. I think that the best way to understand
this practice is not to consider each source an exception to the rule that
extrinsic evidence is not admissible if a policy provision has a plain meaning.
Rather, although these sources of meaning are extrinsic to the insurance
policy, they are not extrinsic evidence because, for all practical purposes,
they are not evidence. By this I mean not only that they need not be formally
admitted into evidence. More importantly, what renders them not evidence
is that their existence or non-existence is not a question of fact that is subject
only to the highly deferential review that is accorded to findings of fact at
the appellate level.
On the contrary, whether to employ implicit knowledge, take
judicial notice of an adjudicative fact, or rely on a legislative fact – and what
these sources reveal to be true – are decisions for the court – in effect,
decisions of law – and as such are subject to de novo review on appeal. This
insight explains and justifies the vast majority of references to and reliance
on sources outside the four corners of the insurance policy by plain-meaning
courts.
This is especially important in view of the fact that the vast majority
of insurance disputes concern standard-form policy provisions whose
meaning, whatever it is, governs the rights of numerous policyholders. If
standard-form policy provisions are to have a standard meaning, the
resolution of insurance disputes must have the effect of precedent under stare
decisis. If interpretations typically involved the resolution of questions of
fact, then most interpretive decisions by the courts that relied on judicial
notice and legislative facts could have little or no stare decisis effect. But of
course they do have that effect. It follows that judicial interpretations of
standard-form policy provisions relying on sources of meaning extrinsic to
the policy are not resolutions of questions of fact based on conventional
evidence, and therefore that the sources of meaning outside the four corners
of the policy on which they rely are not really factual evidence at all. In short,
there is nothing inconsistent or paradoxical about plain-meaning courts
considering these sources of meaning.
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Once a plain-meaning court determines that a policy provision is
ambiguous, then the plain-meaning rule no longer precludes the admission
of extrinsic evidence to determine the more reasonable interpretation of the
ambiguous provision.77 Only the conventional rules of evidence limit what
the court may consider when a policy provision is ambiguous. Common
forms of extrinsic evidence include the negotiations, if any, between the
parties, their course of dealing once the policy has been issued,78 custom and
usage,79 and the drafting history of standard-form policy provisions.80
In most jurisdictions the courts first attempt to determine whether,
in light of any extrinsic evidence that is admitted after a court holds that a
policy provision is ambiguous, the ambiguous provision has a single
meaning.81 This is interpretation. Only if the extrinsic evidence does not
resolve the ambiguity in this fashion does the court then apply contra
proferentem. This is construction. An important but little-recognized issue
regarding interpretation of ambiguous policy provisions is the stare decisis
effect of an interpretation, for this concerns whether, and when,
77

RLLI § 4 cmt. b.
See, e.g., Motors Liquidation Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., No: N11C–12–022
FSS CCLD, 2013 WL 7095859 at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2013).
79
See, e.g., Transp. Indem. Co. v Dahlen Transp., Inc., 161 N.W. 2d 546,
550 (Minn. 1968) (considering evidence of insurance industry custom and
usage).
80
See, e.g., Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 74142 (Tex. 1998).
81
In a minority of jurisdictions, the courts apply contra
proferentem immediately upon concluding that a policy provision is
ambiguous, without considering extrinsic evidence of the provision’s
meaning. See, e.g., Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943, 949
(Fl. 2013); Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law,
101 MINN. L. REV. 1457, 1505-10 (arguing that this should be the rule
generally). In addition, sometimes when a court immediately applies contra
proferentem, it is not possible to determine which approach a court is
applying, because it is unclear from the court’s opinion whether any extrinsic
evidence was introduced. See, e.g., Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d.
838 (3d Cir. 1981); N. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 22 P.3d 739 (Or. 2001).
78

356

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol.25

interpretations of unambiguous and ambiguous policy provisions have the
same kind of precedential effect. Similarly, a little-recognized issue
regarding the construction of ambiguous policy provisions is whether there
is a role to be played by the very different reasons for a policy provision’s
ambiguity. I discuss both issues below.
A.

INTERPRETING AMBIGUOUS POLICY PROVISIONS

Sometimes interpretation based in part on extrinsic evidence reaches
the conclusion that the policy provision at issue has a single meaning.
Interpretations of this sort typically are given the same strong stare decisis
effect as interpretations under the plain-meaning rule. But whether this
makes sense depends on what sources of meaning were called upon to
interpret the provision. If the interpretation is a decision of law, then it should
have that stare decisis effect. On the other hand, if truly evidentiary, factual
sources have been considered – as is permitted once the provision has been
determined to be ambiguous – then the interpretation arrived at may be based
in whole or in part on findings of fact, and the stare decisis effect of the
decision should be more limited.82
For example, if in order to interpret a provision a court based its
interpretation on statements made by the parties in negotiating the policy or
in custom-drafting it, or on the course of dealing between the parties
subsequent to the issuance of the policy, then the decision would have only
the stare decisis effect, if any, that a decision relying on findings of fact about
such matters may have. A dispute between different parties over the meaning
of the same ambiguous policy provision could therefore be resolved
differently, depending on the extrinsic evidence relevant to their independent
dispute.83 An appellate court reviewing such interpretations would have only
82

Professor Farnsworth has made this point about the scope of review of
contract decisions generally. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, §7.17. But
he does not extend the point to stare decisis, and I have never seen the point
made, in either respect, about interpretations of insurance policy language.
83
For examples of such disputes in classic cases, see Silberg v. Cal. Life
Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1109 (Cal. 1974) (involving dispute over insurance
industry custom regarding payment of claims and subsequently seeking
reimbursement from insured or another insurer); Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen.
Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 855 (N.J. 1993) (involving dispute over
inferences to be drawn from drafting history of the qualified pollution
exclusion in CGL policies).
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limited authority to reverse them, presumably for something like abuse of
discretion.
On the other hand, suppose that a court rested its interpretation on
findings of fact that were more generally relevant to the interpretation of the
policy provision, such as custom and usage within an industry (including the
insurance industry), or the drafting history of a standard-form provision.
There is no question that appellate courts treat such interpretations as being
reviewable de novo.84 In my experience, subsequent courts asked to interpret
the same policy provision treat the earlier decision as having stare decisis
effect. This evidently precludes revisiting the factual predicates on which the
earlier decision rested, including the nature and significance of custom and
usage, and implications of the drafting history of the ambiguous policy
provision at issue.
Why do interpretations resting on findings about generallyapplicable facts such as industry custom and usage, and standard-form
drafting history, have the broad stare decisis effect that they are usually
accorded, even though the interpretations rest on factual premises that in
other settings could be relitigated? For example, why are interpretations
based on drafting history treated as if they are not subject to re-litigation in
a claim by a different policyholder?
I think there are several possible explanations. First, this treatment
may actually be unjustified or not even (strictly speaking) what actually
happens. In fact, it may be that courts adhere to decisions based on findings
of fact regarding industry custom or drafting history mainly because
subsequent litigants do not attempt to introduce new evidence regarding
these matters, and that the courts would actually consider substantial new
evidence, and decide differently if the evidence warranted doing so,
especially after the passage of a considerable amount of time. Perhaps
decisions based on such matters of fact are potentially subject to re-litigation.
Second, however, if this is the case, re-litigation could be highly
disruptive. Then, a particular trial court’s findings of fact about custom or
drafting history might in principle be subject to a different inference by a
subsequent trial court, even if no new evidence were introduced. Standard
policy language would then potentially be subject to different interpretations,
depending on findings by different courts, case-by-case.

84

See, e.g., PBM Nutritionals, LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 724 S.E.2d
707, 712 (Va. 2012) (holding that an appellate court reviews interpretations
of insurance contracts de novo).
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Third, the courts may be treating findings about such matters as
custom and usage and drafting history as involving legislative rather than
adjudicative facts, and therefore subject to de novo appellate review that
generates a strong stare decisis effect. That may be an accurate
characterization of certain such facts – the general and undisputable
explanation for the addition of an absolute pollution exclusion to CGL
insurance policies beginning in 1986 is a good example.85 But that cannot be
the explanation for the strong stare decisis effect accorded other
interpretations that involve disputable characterizations of custom and usage
or drafting history.
Fourth, the justification for this treatment may resonate with the
principle underlying non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel. If a
policyholder has won a case involving facts generally relevant to the
meaning of a standard-form policy provision, then a subsequent, different
insurer is treated as being bound by the earlier decision that technically binds
only the earlier insurer. The second insurer stands in the shoes of the earlier
insurer as long as the earlier insurer had an incentive to fully litigate the issue
in question, and lost. This whole analogy would work against insurers, but
not against policyholders, since one policyholder cannot reasonably be
understood to have been litigating on behalf of all policyholders.
Finally, it may be that the practice of according stare decisis effect
to interpretations based on generally-applicable facts is a prudential exercise
by the courts rather than one that, technically, is mandatory. The practice
facilitates treating standard-form policy language as having a uniform
meaning, and thereby enhances the advantages of having standard-form
policies.86 If an earlier factual finding about the significance of custom and
usage or drafting history for the meaning of an ambiguous standard-form
provision turns out later to have been flawed, later courts still can exercise
their discretion to revisit it. Since stare decisis is itself an essentially
prudential doctrine,87 the seemingly anomalous precedential effect that the
courts give to interpretations based on custom and usage and drafting history
may be more apparent than real.

85

See Am. States Ins. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 79-82 (Ill. 1997).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(2) (indicating that
interpreting standard form contracts so as to treat similarly-situated parties
in the same manner is desirable).
87
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 36 (2009)
(noting the practice of “ordinarily requiring that decisions follow
precedent”).
86
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CONTRA PROFERENTEM: THREE LEVELS OF CONSTRUCTION
AGAINST THE DRAFTER

It is quite possible for a policy provision to remain ambiguous even
after consideration of extrinsic evidence relevant to the meaning of the
provision. In such cases, under the traditional application of contra
proferentem, the provision is construed against the drafter, which in the case
of standard-form provisions is the insurer. The one recognized limit in this
situation is that a construction that affords policyholders coverage that they
could not reasonably expect is not to be adopted.88 This might be understood
as an interpretive limit on contra proferentem, since in a sense an
interpretation that would afford policyholders more coverage than they
would reasonably expect is not a reasonable interpretation.
There also are hints in the case law, however, that the reason that a
policy provision is ambiguous may have a bearing on the process of
construction. These hints actually have a substantial normative basis that has
not been recognized: the greater the amount of blame for the ambiguity that
can be attributed to the drafter, the stronger the justification for construing
the provision against the insurer and in favor of coverage. There are three
levels of blameworthiness, corresponding to the reason that the provision
came to be drafted as it was.
1. Ambiguity by Necessity
Some policy provisions are ambiguous out of necessity. The
problem they address may be complex, the language that would be required
to unambiguously resolve particular issues in advance of all disputes may be
lengthier than is practical or desirable,89 or all the situations to which the
88

See RLLI, at § 4 cmt. f; Chute v. North River Ins. Co., 214 N.W. 473,
474 (Minn. 1927) (holding that construing an ambiguous policy provision in
favor of coverage the policyholder could not reasonably expect would
“ignore the purpose of the contract”). In my earlier Article about insurance
policy interpretation, I called this the “majoritarian” approach,
distinguishing it from a “penalty” approach that would construe an
ambiguous provision in favor of coverage regardless of whether it was
reasonable to expect that coverage. Abraham supra note 14, at 545-50.
89
See Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law, 101
MINN. L. REV. 1457, 1474 (2017) (arguing that longer policy provisions
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provision may apply may be difficult to predict and unambiguously address.
As one court astutely put this point:
Drafters cannot anticipate all possible interactions of fact and text,
and if they could to attempt to cope with them in advance would
leave behind a contract more like a federal procurement manual than
like a traditional insurance policy. Insureds would not be made
better off in the process. The resulting contract would not only be
incomprehensible but also more expensive.90
For example, the standard-form homeowners policy defines an
insured (among other things) as “residents of your [the policyholder’s]
household who are:...21 and in your care or the care of a resident of your
household who is your relative.”91 Although I have found no cases on the
issue, there is a pretty good argument that the word “care” in this context is
ambiguous, in the sense that it has either pretty broad or quite narrow
boundaries.92 Being “in your care” might require that the policyholder serve
as the complete support for a bedridden person who is unable to perform
bodily functions without assistance, or it might require only serving a
temporarily ill person meals and helping the person to get out of bed. But
specifying the exact contours of “care,” especially given the different
possible gradations of “care,” would require extended verbiage addressed to
an issue that is likely to arise only rarely under homeowners’ policies. The
result is that the term “care” is ambiguous, and would likely remain
makes it more difficult for policies to be understood ex ante, by those selling
them, regulating them, and deciding whether to buy them). In my earlier
article, I referred to this kind of assessment as the application of a “linguistic
standard of care.” Abraham, supra note 14, at 537-38. To ignore this factor
would, I think, be to impose strict liability on the drafter for employing
unavoidably ambiguous policy language. Id. at 538-40.
90
See Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 974, 976 (7th Cir.
1991); FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, §7.09 (indicating that the difficulty of
foreseeing all the circumstances that will arise sometimes accounts for lack
of clarity).
91
See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 186-87 (emphasis
added).
92
Professor Farnsworth identifies haziness at the boundary of a concept
as “vagueness,” and suggests that intentional vagueness may be more
justified than intentional ambiguity. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, at §7.09.
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ambiguous even if extrinsic evidence addressing the meaning of the term
were available and admitted.
Similarly, the standard-form CGL policy covers liability incurred
because of bodily injury or property damage that occurs “during the policy
period,” and further provides that such bodily injury or property damage
“includes any continuation, change or resumption of that ‘bodily injury’ or
‘property damage’ after the end of the policy period.”93 The term “that”
(technically, a “demonstrative adjective”94) is almost certainly ambiguous in
some contexts. Suppose that during policy year one, hazardous waste leaks
from a site and contaminates groundwater (underground water) lying fifty
feet beyond the boundary of the site where it was deposited. That is “property
damage.” Suppose further, however, that in policy year two, the waste that
was already in the groundwater migrates further, and contaminates
previously-uncontaminated groundwater, lying between 50 and 500 feet
beyond the boundary of the site. Under the above-quoted provision, is the
contamination that occurred during policy year 2 a continuation of “that”
original property damage (in which case it is not covered under the policy in
force during year 2), or is it new “property damage” that is not counted as
part of the original property damage (and therefore is covered under the
policy in force in year 2)?
In this context, both are arguably reasonable interpretations on the
face of this policy language. Extrinsic evidence would be admissible to
determine which interpretation is more reasonable, but may well not resolve
the ambiguity. Yet, whichever interpretation is adopted would have required
extensive verbiage to address unambiguously in the policy, especially since
my hypothetical is an example of only of a number of different factual
scenarios that might have to be identified. In effect, the term “that” is a
placeholder that, understandably, delegates the task of elaboration to the
courts.
This necessity explanation for ambiguity of the sort reflected in the
homeowners’ policy’s use of the term “care,” and the CGL policy’s use of
the term “that,” justifies an evenhanded search for the more reasonable
interpretation of the policy provision in the context of the claim at issue,
because the insurer’s drafting does not reflect sloppiness or an effort to take
advantage of policyholders. In this setting, contra proferentem should
93

Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
See What is a Demonstrative Adjective?, YOUR DICTIONARY https://
grammar.yourdictionary.com/parts-of-speech/adjectives/demonstrativeadjectives.html (last visited on May 20, 2019).
94
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operate as a rule of last resort, a genuine tiebreaker to be used only when the
evidence does not generate a single interpretation that is at least slightly more
reasonable than a competing interpretation or interpretation.
The courts, however, tend not to resolve such situations in this way.
Rather, often they avoid holding that a policy provision that is ambiguous
out of necessity, and instead treat the situation as calling for the creation of
a rule governing the problem rather than for an interpretation of the policy
language. Perhaps the most prominent example of this approach is the courts’
adoption of the pro-rata approach to the allocation of coverage responsibility
among multiple triggered CGL insurance policies that were issued before the
above-quoted provision addressing the continuation of injury or damage was
included in the standard-form policy. The CGL policy covered liability “for
those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages...
because of bodily injury or property damage...which occurs during the policy
period.”95 The policy did not unambiguously address the extent of each
policy’s coverage responsibility if bodily injury or property damage occurred
during multiple policy periods. But the courts nonetheless developed a rule
that allocated coverage responsibility on a pro-rata basis.96
Another example of this approach is the courts’ treatment of
exclusions from coverage of liability for bodily injury or property damage
“expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.”97 These
exclusions are arguably ambiguous in a number of ways. For instance, they
do not address whether coverage of one insured is excluded when another
insured expected or intended harm; and they do not address whether
coverage is excluded when one type of harm (e.g., bodily injury) is expected
but a different type of harm (e.g., property damage) occurs. On one view,
addressing all these possibilities would render the provision unduly
complicated.98 Instead of holding that the provision is ambiguous, therefore,
95

See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 440
(1990).
96
See, e.g., Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 NE. 2d 290
(Mass. 2009). Other courts adopted a rule of joint and several responsibility.
See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 N.E.
2d 835 (Ohio 2002).
97
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 440.
98
The reason I have qualified this statement is that the standard-form
homeowners policy has addressed this issue with fairly straightforward
language. See id. at 205 (setting out a provision indicating that liability for
harm is excluded even if that harm is “of a different kind, quality or degree
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the courts have developed rules (though they vary) addressing these
permutations.99
In such cases, the courts do not appear to be engaging in either
interpretation or construction. In fact, however, they are doing the latter. The
best understanding of the courts’ development of rules of this sort to see it
as the construction of policy provisions that are necessarily ambiguous.
Because the drafter of provisions that are ambiguous by necessity is arguably
not to blame for such ambiguity, invoking contra proferentem is regarded as
inappropriate. Instead, the courts substitute a rule for what would otherwise
be an unduly complex policy provision.
2. Ambiguity Resulting from Faulty Drafting
A second, and more blameworthy, reason that a policy provision
may ambiguous is that it has been poorly drafted. The courts have frequently
held that, the more easily it would have been to draft a provision that would
have rendered its meaning clear, the stronger the argument that the provision
is ambiguous.100 The classic statement of this notion is that of Judge Frankel
in the Pan American case:
Where the risk is well known and there are terms reasonably apt and
precise to describe it, the use of substantially less certain
phraseology upon which dictionaries and common understanding
may fairly differ, is likely to result in interpretations favoring
coverage rather than exclusion.101

than initially expected for intended”).
99
See, e.g., SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266
(N.J. 1992) (preserving the possibility of coverage when a different type of
harm than occurred was expected); American Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628
N.W. 2d 605 (Minn. 2001) (holding that the exclusion applies as long as
some harm was expected).
100
See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 540-44 (referring to this
as a “perfectibility standard).
101
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 368 F.
Supp. 1098, 1188 (S.D. N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). See
also Estrin Const. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W. 2d 413 (noting
that an inept drafter has the resources to do better).
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For example, in Vlastos v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. (Europe),
a policy provisions stated, “Warranted that the 3rd floor is occupied as [a]
janitor’s residence.”102 There was evidence that a janitor lived on the third
floor, but that it had other uses as well. The insurer denied coverage on the
ground that the provision required that the third floor be used only as a
janitor’s residence. The court rejected this argument, holding that the
provision was ambiguous its face, because “occupied” could reasonably have
meant either “occupied exclusively” or “occupied in part.”103 The fact that
the addition of a single word – “exclusively” – would have rendered the
provision unambiguous was central to the court’s reasoning.104
Because one of the strongest arguments for contra proferentem has
always been that the doctrine gives insurers the incentive to draft
unambiguous policy provisions, a strong version of contra proferentem tends
to be applied to faulty drafting that results in ambiguity. If an insurer drafts
a sloppy or imprecise provision that could have been made unambiguous
with little additional effort and no corresponding disadvantage, then the
insurer has, in effect, been negligent. If there is also no extrinsic evidence
supporting the insurer’s interpretation, the principle underlying contra
proferentem strongly supports construing the provision against the drafter.
Even if there is extrinsic evidence supporting the insurer, however,
contra proferentem should have substantial gravitational pull. The argument
for rescuing the insurer by heavily weighing sources of extrinsic evidence
such as the negotiations between the parties or custom and usage, is weak in
this setting. Only strong and highly persuasive evidence should be permitted
to rescue the insurer from its own faulty drafting in such a situation.
3. Ambiguity as a Trap
The last reason for ambiguity resonates most strongly with the policy
underlying contra proferentem: the use of ambiguous policy language as a
trap. Ordinarily there will be no direct evidence that an insurer deliberately
102

Vlastos v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. (Europe), 707 F.2d 775
(3d Cir. 1983).
103
Id at 780.
104
See also Great American Fidelity Ins. Co. v. JWR Construction
Services, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1356 (S.D. Fl. 2012) (indicating that had the
insurer “wished to exclude the faulty work of persons acting on [the
insured’s] behalf, it could easily have done so by using clear policy language
to that effect”).
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designed an ambiguous policy provision with the aim of using it as a trap.
Certainly standard-form language, drafted by committees of organizations
such as ISO, rarely if ever has that aim. But individual insurers sometimes
draft language that sets a trap, and even standard-form language is sometimes
seized upon by individual insurers in a manner that functions like a trap.
For example, in Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Amer., an aviation insurance
policy covered occurrences, accidents, or losses that happened “within the
United States of America, its territories or possessions, Canada or
Mexico.”105 The insured’s plane crashed in the sea, twenty-five miles west
of Puerto Rico, on a flight that began in New York, with stops in Miami and
Haiti.106 The insurer denied coverage, on the ground that the loss did not
occur “within” the required territory. Yet the insurer knew that the insured
planned to fly the plane in the Caribbean. This was a blatant effort to use the
literal meaning of the word “within” to avoid coverage. The court rejected
that effort, holding that the word “within” was ambiguous – subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation -- and construed the provision against the
insurer, in part because the insured’s interpretation was consistent with the
“realities of airplane travel,” which sometimes requires flights between two
places within the continental United States (such as flights between New
York and Miami) to “pass over waters beyond the territorial limits” of the
United States.
The insurer’s attempt to set a trap was even more blatant in Silberg
v. California Life Ins. Co.,107 the seminal decision permitting the imposition
of extracontractual liability on an insurer for bad-faith denial of a claim.
There a provision in a health insurance policy excluded coverage of “any
loss caused by or resulting from (1) injury or sickness for which
compensation is payable under any Workmen’s Compensation...Law.”108
The insurer asserted that this exclusion precluded coverage, not only of any
loss paid by workers’ compensation but of all losses incurred by the insured
for an injury or sickness for which workers’ compensation paid anything at
all.
The insurer therefore refused to pay any of the insured’s losses until
it was determined whether any workers’ compensation would be paid, and
when the insured settled his workers’ compensation claim, the insurer denied
105

See Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d at 840.
Id.
107
521 P. 2d 1103 (Cal. 1974) (emphasis added).
108
Id. at 1111.
106
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coverage entirely, including for the losses that workers’ compensation did
not pay. The insurer did this despite having advertised “ALL BENEFITS
PAYABLE IN FULL REGARDLESS OF ANY OTHER INSURANCE
YOU MAY HAVE.”109 This is about as clear an example as there can be of
insurer’s attempt at bait-and-switch. Clearly the insurer was using the
ambiguity of the word “payable” as a trap.
Finally, the insurer in Corban v. United Automobile Services
Association110 took the position that the “anti-concurrent causation” clause
in its homeowners policy, which precluded coverage if a loss was “caused”
by an excluded cause, even if a covered cause contributed “in any sequence”
to the loss, precluded coverage of loss caused by hurricane wind damage, if
later-caused (and excluded) water damage contributed to that loss.111 The
court held that the phrase “in any sequence” was ambiguous and invoked
contra proferentem, in part because the insurer’s interpretation would have
excluded coverage of loss that had already occurred, on the ground that an
excluded cause subsequently contributed to the loss.112 The insurer’s position
offered what in common parlance would be called a “gotcha” interpretation:
“your loss occurred, and it was covered at the moment it occurred, but
subsequent events out of your control deprived you of insurance for this
already-covered loss.” Few if any insureds would have expected that result,
or understood the relevant language to provide for it. It reflected an effort by
the insurer to use the language of the anti-concurrent causation clause as a
trap that had been set for the insured and then sprung after a covered loss had
occurred.
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of insurance policies turns out to be a more
sophisticated and more complex process than the myths about interpretation
sometimes make it out to be. Interpretations yielding the conclusion that a
policy provision has a single, plain meaning are often active searches for
meaning, not passive receptions of a meaning that is evident on the face of a
provision. In addition, the idea that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
aid in the interpretation of a provision with a plain meaning masks the fact
that important sources of meaning that are outside the policy are commonly
considered in the course of interpretation. Finally, both the stare decisis
109
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20 So. 3d 601 (Miss. 601).
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Id. at 612.
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Id. at 615.
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effect of interpretations of ambiguous policy language, and differences in the
reasons that an ambiguous policy provision came to be included in a policy,
pose issues that have gone largely unrecognized because of the tendency to
oversimplify what occurs when ambiguous policy language is interpreted or
construed. Greater clarity about all of these interpretive phenomena deepens
our understanding of the role played by plain meaning, extrinsic evidence,
and ambiguity in the interpretation of insurance policies.

